The point being that Napoleon had the mental determination and physical stamina to follow his plan to victory. The majority of troops captured during that battle resulted from a scared NCO destroying the main bridge before the retreat was complete. Even at Leipzig Napoleon faced an enemy almost twice his size, fought them to a standstill while surrounded, and only retired after running short of ammunition. During 1813 Napoleon accumulated a list of battle field victories while his subordinates lost.
Yet these objections are only raised in response to his finally losing. And then left a garrison there when it was needed for Leipzig, but he probably assumed that the defensive positions there would allow him another Dresden type victory. He vacillated on whether to abandon Dresden because he needed to ensure the continued support of the Saxon King. His operations against Berlin robbed him of the mass needed for a decisive victory, but he needed to break apart the Sixth Coalition that was rapidly gaining strength. He devised a “master plan” that focused on a terrain objective instead of opposing army. But then he maneuvered those armies with corps commanders that lacked the ability to operate independently. His raising an army from the broken remnants of the Russian campaign is noteworthy for his determination and resolve. His army was the same size as earlier ones but of decidedly inferior quality. This results in an interesting paradox, as Napoleon’s ambition resulted in amazing maneuvers and offensive victories, yet this same ambition multiplied his enemies, negated chances for peace and prevented him from overall victory.ĭuring the campaigns of 1813 Napoleon continually taxed his means. This unbalance darkens the mind and prevents the commander from having the inner light ( Coup de’ oeil) or “discriminating judgment” and determination necessary for military genius. While his ambition motivated himself and his troops it also may have resulted in what Clausewitz calls an “unbalance”. His ambition was such that “having a Napoleon complex” has entered the everyday lexicon.
This leads to one of Napoleon’s disadvantages. So Napoleon did not face normal tests of courage, but faced struggles that perhaps no man since Oliver Cromwell had to contend with. Napoleon rarely had to brave enemy fire, yet he did struggle with the weight of moving, defending and defeating entire armies Napoleon also had to defend the revolution that he personified and maneuver adroitly within the constantly evolving political situations. This refers to personal courage as well as the courage to accept responsibility. He describes courage as the first requirement. In short, Napoleon ranks as a genius from his actions before, during, and after the battle of Leipzig and not because of his win loss ratio, or subsequent vanquishing.Ĭlausewitz gives several criteria for genius. Clausewitz suggests that chance is uncontrollable, but that the quality of the decisions made in response to chance is what determines genius. Yet when historians say they see a flash of genius, they are acknowledging the genius of Napoleon’s plans but allow the final result to color their analysis. So if his decisions that led to victory would qualify for genius, why would the same decisions disqualify him after a defeat? Historians that examine the final result might disqualify him or use lines like “flash of genius” to describe his campaigns. If Napoleon would have won the battle of Leipzig he would have been called a battlefield genius. Since Napoleon lost the battle of Leipzig, was forced to give up control of Germany, and finally required to abdicate a year later, the term genius may seem like an overstatement, but it was his political failings that robbed the battlefield commander of his reputation. After studying the descriptions laid down by Clausewitz and then studying the decisions and actions of Napoleon in the events surrounding the conflict at Leipzig, Napoleon as a general would qualify for the title of “genius.” An examination of Napoleon’s conduct at The battle of Leipzig using the criteria established by Clausewitz allows us to determine if the general could be classified as a genius. In particular, Clausewitz’s material concerning military genius provides excellent material that one can test in a case study. The writings of Karl Von Clausewitz continue to provide historians with judging criteria for matters of war. Genius at Leipzig? A Study of Napoleon’s Leadership Skills as Judged By Clausewitz By Morgan T.